On paradigms, the scientific community, and legal science

Abstract

The article analyzes Nicolás Salvi’s La condición multiparadigmática del Derecho, focusing on its main epistemological contributions. It highlights the adoption of an expanded version of Thomas Kuhn’s theory—mediated by the works of Margaret Masterman and George Ritzer—to conceptualize law as a multiparadigmatic normal science. Based on this thesis, it reconstructs the idea of conflicting “disciplinary matrices” within the contemporary legal community. The article raises specific objections, including the inclusion of natural law within the interpretivist matrix, which may lead to a reading close to the traditional trialist model, with its known epistemological ambiguities. It also reflects on the lack of mutual scientific recognition among legal scholars, suggesting a distinctive feature of legal science compared to other social sciences. Finally, it defends the relevance of applying Kuhnian categories to the analysis of law, emphasizing their structural affinity with political theory and historical-social approaches.